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Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge International groups of academics are busy drafting European principles of delictual liability 5 and of trust law. 6 Textbooks are being written which analyse particular areas of law under a European perspective and deal with the rules of English, French or German law as local variations of a common theme. 7 At least two legal periodicals are competing for the attention of lawyers interested in the development of European private law. 8 The Commission of the European Communities has increased the mobility of law students through its immensely successful Erasmus (now Socrates) scheme. 9 More and more law faculties in Europe try to obtain a 'Euro'-profile by establishing integrated courses and programmes on an undergraduate and postgraduate level. 10 Chairs are established for European Private Law, European Legal History or Comparative Legal Culture. Interest has been rekindled in the 'old' European ius commune and legal historians are busy recognising, once again, the European perspective of their subject, rediscovering the common historical foundations of the modern law and restoring good faith in european contract l aw 9
intellectual contact with comparative and modern private lawyers. or Israel. 18 The internationalisation of private law is also vigorously promoted by the uniform private law based on international conventions which cover large areas of commercial law. 19 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in particular, has been adopted by close to fifty states (among them ten of the member states of the European Union) 20 and is starting to give rise to a considerable amount of case law. 21 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law has published a set of Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 22 Somewhat surprisingly, in view of widespread scepticism expressed in the 1960s and '70s, the idea of codification has been regaining ground internationally. 23 The new Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek (B.W.) has aroused considerable interest but it is neither the only nor even the latest recent codification. 24 The academic lawyer today does indeed live in a golden age. 25 There can no longer be any question about the change in perspective we are experiencing at the moment: we cannot stop, or wish away, the re-emergence of a European (as opposed to merely national) private law. We can, however, influence both the speed and scope of the development. One of good faith in european contract l awthe most important issues discussed in this respect today is whether European private law (or at least the law of obligations) should be codified. The European Parliament, for instance, has repeatedly called for such a step to be taken. 26 Academic lawyers have, by and large, received this idea with considerable reservation; the opinion seems to prevail that, even if a European Civil Code may ultimately be desirable, the time is not yet ripe for it. But whether one inclines towards the bold proposition of a Thibaut redivivus or subscribes to the more cautious attitude of a modern Savigny, 27 it is clearly desirable to take stock of the situation de lege lata: to ascertain the amount of common ground already existing between the national legal systems and to identify discrepancies on the level of specific result, general approach and doctrinal nuance. This is what the present comparative study attempts to do for one specific topic within the general law of contract.
II. Good faith: common core or imposition?
The topic chosen is, no doubt, somewhat unconventional. So is the method adopted. Both points therefore need some explanation. It is hardly accidental that neither the second part of Zweigert/Kötz, 'An Introduction to Comparative Law', 28 nor Kötz, 'Europäisches Vertragsrecht' 29 contain a chapter on 'good faith'. Comparative studies normally focus on specific subject matters, problem areas and real life sit-uations, or on relatively well-defined legal institutions like mistake, agency or stipulatio alteri. 'Good faith' fits into neither of these categories. At the same time, however, it is at least in some legal systems regarded as a vitally important ingredient for a modern general law of contract.
30 That immediately raises the question how other legal systems cope without it. This inquiry appears to be all the more topical since all member states of the European Union have implemented the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and will thus have to come to terms with a general notion of 'good faith' in a central area of their contract law. 31 At first sight, one might be inclined to agree with the latter proposition. Moreover, we appear to be dealing with a rather clear-cut civil law/common law divide. 'Scots law based its system of consensual contracts on the ius commune but . . . it has not accepted the civilian doctrine that the exercise of contractual rights is subject to the principles of good faith. The better view is that like English law it requires strict adherence to contracts': this is how a prominent lawyer from a mixed jurisdiction has recently restated the apparent dichotomy. 36 And indeed, statements to the effect that English contract law does not recognise a general concept of good faith are legion. It tolerates 'a certain moral insensitivity in the interest of economic efficiency'
37 and values 'predictability of the legal outcome of a case' more highly 'than absolute justice'. 38 Common law lawyers have traditionally tended to regard 'good faith [as] an invitation to judges to abandon the duty of legally reasoned decisions and to produce an unanalytical incantation of personal values'; and they point out that it 'could well work practical mischief if ruthlessly implanted into our system of law'.
39 A duty to negotiate in good faith has even been described as 'inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations' and as 'unworkable in practice'. 40 Closer inspection, however, shows that matters are more complex. The position in English law appears to be much less unequivocal than a continental lawyer faced with some of these general propositions might be led to expect. Conversely, the civilian approach is much less uniform than a common law lawyer might be led to believe. 41 This, we hope, will become apparent in the main section of this book which seeks to investigate the ways in which European legal systems deal with cases which, in the view of some of them, attract the application of a general principle of good faith. Before explaining how this section was put together, we will offer a few introductory remarks attempting to set the scene.
III. Bona fides
The notion of 'good faith', or bona fides, finds its origin in Roman law. 42 In relation to iudicia stricti iuris (claims which have to be adjudicated upon according to strict law) it gained its influence as a result of a specific standard clause, inserted at the request of the defendant into the procedural formula which defined the issue to be tried by the judge. This clause was known as the exceptio doli and it was worded in the alternative: 'si in ea re nihil dolo malo A i A i factum sit neque fiat' (if in this matter nothing has been done, or is being done, in bad faith by the plaintiff). 43 It was particularly the second alternative (neque fiat -or is being done) that made the exceptio doli such a powerful instrument in bringing about a just solution, for it invited an answer which located dolus not so much in personal misconduct, but rather in an inequity or injustice that would flow from the action being allowed to succeed. 44 Ultimately, therefore, it gave the judge an equitable discretion to decide the case before him in accordance with what appeared to be fair and reasonable. 45 This, essentially, was the regime applicable to one cornerstone of the Roman contractual system, the stipulation, for it was governed by the iudicium stricti iuris par excellence, the condictio. 46 The other cornerstone was the consensual contracts. A specific device in the form of an exceptio doli was here not necessary in order to check the improper exercise of contractual rights. 47 The judge had this discretion anyway for he was, according to the formulae applicable to these kinds of contracts, instructed to condemn the defendant into ' that account the defendant should give to, or do for, the plaintiff in good faith). 48 The substantive content of the exceptio doli, in other words, was absorbed into the requirement of good faith according to which the dispute had to be decided.
Bona fides was one of the most fertile agents in the development of Roman contract law. In the contract of sale, for instance, it paved the way for the reception of the aedilitian remedies into the ius civile. 49 The harsh principle of caveat emptor was thus largely abandoned. Similarly, the buyer was granted an action to claim his positive interest in cases of eviction.
50
On a more general level, bona fides allowed error (mistake) and metus (duress) to be taken into account in determining whether an actio empti or venditi could be granted.
51 Equally, the judge was able to consider a counterclaim arising from the same transaction and to condemn the defendant only in the difference between the two claims.
52 Liability for latent defects, the rules relating to the implied warranty of peaceable possession, rescission of contracts on account of mistake and metus, set-off: these and many other institutions of modern contract law can be traced back to the iudicia bonae fidei of Roman law. They were retained in spite of the fact that decline, and eventual abolition, of the formulary procedure had led to an absorption of the concept of bona fides into the broader notion of aequitas (equity). 53 Throughout the Middle Ages, and in the early modern period, aequitas remained in the forefront of discussion as a counterpoise to the ius strictum (strict law), 54 but it was commonly identified with bona fides.
55 Bona fides and/or aequitas also dominated relations between merchants and became a fundamental principle of the medieval and early modern lex mercatoria.
56 'Bona fides est primum mobile ac good faith in european contract l aw 17 48 The respective claims therefore came to be designated iudicia bonae fidei (claims which have to be adjudicated upon in terms of the requirements of good faith). 49 See Law of Obligations (n. 45) 320 ff. The aedilitian remedies had been created by the magistrates responsible for the conduct and regulation of the Roman markets and dealt with defects in slaves and certain livestock bought on these markets. 50 Ibid., 296 ff. 51 Ibid., 587 ff., 658. 52 Ibid., 761 ff. 53 See Alexander Beck, 'Zu den Grundprinzipien der bona fides im römischen Vertragsrecht', in: Aequitas und bona fides -Festgabe für August Simonius (1955) 24 ff. 54 Cf., e.g., Gunter Wesener, 'Aequitas naturalis, "natürliche Billigkeit", in der privatrechtlichen Dogmen-und Kodifikationsgeschichte', in: Der Gerechtigkeitsanspruch des Rechts (1996) 81 ff.; Jan Schröder, 'Aequitas und Rechtsquellenlehre in der frühen Neuzeit', Quaderni Fiorentini 26 (1997) 265 ff. 55 For all details, see the contribution by James Gordley to the present volume. 56 Rudolf Meyer, Bona fides und lex mercatoria in der europäischen Rechtstradition (1994) 61 ff. spiritus vivificans commercii' (good faith is the prime mover and lifegiving spirit of commerce) as Casaregis put it; and in the same vein Baldus had stated 'bonam fidem valde requiri in his, qui plurimum negotiantur' (good faith is much required of those, who trade most). 57 As in Roman law, bona fides significantly contributed to the kind of flexibility, convenience and informality required by the international community of merchants.
IV. Treu und Glauben

'Baneful plague' or 'queen of rules'?
In Germany, bona fides could conveniently be blended with the indigenous notion of Treu und Glauben (literally: fidelity and faith): a phrase which we find in a number of medieval sources and which was used, in the context of commercial relations, as a synonym for bona fides.
58 Treu und Glauben also, of course, was ultimately destined to find its way into the famous § 242 of the German Civil Code of 1900: 'Der Schuldner ist verpflichtet, die Leistung so zu bewirken, wie Treu und Glauben mit Rücksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern.' 59 This is not the only place where the BGB refers to Treu und Glauben; for according to § 157 BGB 'contracts shall be interpreted according to the requirements of good faith, ordinary usage being taken into consideration'.
In view of its subsequent interpretation, the wording of § 242 BGB is surprisingly narrow. It merely relates to the manner in which performance must be rendered. 60 Determination of the content of a contract is regulated in § 157 and is regarded as a matter of interpretation. It is not entirely clear whether the draftsmen of the BGB really intended to give the principle of good faith such a restricted field of operation. The first draft had still contained one comprehensive clause according to which 'the contract obliges the contracting party to whatever results from the provisions and the nature of the contract according to law and ordinary usage and with reference to good faith, as content of his obligation'. 61 This had come closer to the exceptio doli generalis as it had been recognised in pandectist legal literature and applied by nineteenth-century courts. 62 The term exceptio doli, of course, no longer had the procedural implications of the Roman formulary procedure and was retained, predominantly, as a convenient label. The four consensual contracts, after all, were bonae fidei iudicia; and since they provided the historical foundation of the modern general concept of contract law, 63 the latter was bound to be subject to the regime of bona fides, too. 64 Use of the term exceptio doli, in other words, was tantamount to a recourse to the idea of good faith except that the matter was seen, naturally enough, from the point of view of the defendant.
Soon after the BGB had been adopted, a debate flared up as to whether the exceptio doli was still applicable, be it on the basis of § 242 BGB or as a result of 'the grace of God'. 65 Judicial practice, without much ado, opted for the former alternative and continued to operate as it had done before the promulgation of the code. The Imperial Court, in particular, did not hesitate to grant protection against the improper exercise of legal good faith in european contract l aw 19
rights. 66 The Court thus tried to steer a middle course: neither was it regarded as sufficient if the plaintiff merely acted inequitably nor was judicial intervention to be confined to the extreme case where the only purpose of exercising a right had been to cause damage to another. 67 The application of § 242 BGB soon became a bone of contention in the great methodological disputes of the first part of this century (positivism, free law movement, jurisprudence of interests). 68 Strong language was used. The good faith provision was seen, on the one hand, as 'the source of the baneful plague gnawing in a most sinister manner at the inner core of our legal culture'; 69 on the other hand, it was celebrated as the 'queen of rules' 70 which could be used to unhinge the established legal world.
Adjusting exchange rates
These hopes and fears concerning the judicial function did not, at first, have any impact on mainstream legal literature and practice. Sooner or later, however, the potential conflict between Imperial Supreme Court and Imperial Parliament inherent in this issue was bound to become politically and practically relevant. In Germany this happened on 28 November 1923 when the Imperial Court decided, effectively, to abandon the principle of the nominal value with regard to the Reichsmark. 71 Inflation, by that time, had reached hitherto unimaginable dimensions: one gold mark was traded in November 1923 for 522 billion paper marks. The association of judges of the Imperial Supreme Court had submitted, and published, draft legislation to deal with the problem but the Imperial Parliament remained impassive. It was in this situation that the Court refused to allow a debtor to discharge an obligation incurred before the First World War, and secured by means of a mortgage, by paying the nominal value of the debt in paper marks. 72 The creditor, in the opinion of the Court, could not be compelled to consent to a deletion of the mortgage from the register. Moreover, the Court considered itself entitled to fix a new exchange rate. Obviously, the judges found themselves in a grave moral dilemma: they regarded the inaction of the legislature as intolerable and gravely detrimental to the general respect for law and justice. But the Court attempted to disguise the fundamental issues by using § 242 BGB as a positivistic peg. The unforeseeable devaluation of the mark, so it was argued, had given rise to a conflict between what the principle of nominal value, as embodied in contemporary currency legislation, required and what could in good faith be expected of a debtor concerning the discharge of his obligations. In this conflict, preference had to be given to § 242 BGB which, after all, governed all legal transactions. The currency laws had to be disregarded in so far as they could not be reconciled with the precepts of good faith. 73 This decision hit the German legal community like a bombshell. 74 Here was finally a case where the Court could indeed be said to have unhinged the established legal world. The fixing of exchange rates was certainly not the business of the courts and it was irreconcilable with the exceptio doli generalis even in its most extended version. If general legal provisions could be used to justify this kind of judicial interventionism, anything seemed possible. Perspicacious critics started to realise that this conceivably entailed grave 'dangers for State and law'. 75 These misgivings were fully confirmed by what happened after 1933. The general provisions were one of the most convenient points of departure for imbuing the legal good faith in european contract l aw 21 system with the spirit of the new, 'national' (völkisch) legal ideology. 76 A study of the history of private law of this period reveals the frightening flexibility of the methodological tools available to lawyers inspired by ideological premises and preconceptions. The 'unlimited interpretation' was an important key to the insidious perversion of the legal system by those charged with its preservation. 77 
Domesticating the monster
Today we have still not managed to find a magic formula which defines the line to be drawn between what may properly be classified as 'interpretation' and what is usually referred to as 'judicial development' of the law. 78 The latter phenomenon is not merely tolerated but very widely regarded as indispensable. As long as judicial law-making contra legem is not (openly) permitted, the parliamentary prerogative remains substantially unaffected. 79 But even if great advances have not been made at a general methodological level, the modern German situation is different in two very significant respects. Most importantly, of course, it is no longer the fascist ideology of the 1930s and early '40s which sustains and informs the German legal system. Reacting to the totalitarianism of the Nazi regime, the draftsmen of the Basic Law entrenched respect for human dignity and the right to personal freedom, very prominently, in its first two articles. These articles constitute part of a comprehensive Bill of Rights which does not only provide the individual citizen with protection against the activities of the state but also constitutes a system of basic values permeating the legal system as a whole. 80 Thus, for example, the entire body of private law has to be interpreted in the spirit of the fundamental rights, 81 and the general provisions contained in the BGB are par-ticularly malleable tools in this process. They have greatly facilitated the constitutionalisation of private law and have thus, on the whole, performed a very beneficial function. In the second place it must be noted that German lawyers have become accustomed to thick layers of case law emerging from the interstices of their Code 82 and that they have learnt to cope with this phenomenon. Since the enactment of the Civil Code, countless decisions have relied, in one form or another, on § 242 BGB; and one attempt to record the relevant case law as comprehensively as possible has led to what many consider as the hypertrophy of legal commentary. 83 But despite appearances, the modern German lawyer is not faced with an impenetrable wilderness of single instances. 84 This is due to the endeavours by legal writers, operating in close interaction with the Federal Supreme Court, to discern the different functions of § 242, to categorise its various fields of application and to establish typical 'groups of cases' (Fallgruppen). This process of domestication (or 'concretisation' 85 ) was stimulated by an influential study of the great legal historian Franz Wieacker 86 and it has led, generally speaking, to a more orderly and rational analysis. 87 of § 242 BGB. It is obvious, however, that by arrogating to themselves the right to adjust the contract, the courts are also interfering with the law as laid down by the draftsmen of the BGB. 103 Not unlike the Roman praetor, they have thus acted to correct the civil law (iuris civilis corrigendi causa). 104 
Doctrinal innovations
This is, of course, merely the roughest survey as to how the requirements of § 242 BGB have been specified over the years. Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage has become a sophisticated doctrine in its own right even though it is still discussed, for the sake of convenience, under the umbrella of § 242 BGB. 105 Both the consequences of the Second World War and of the reunification of Germany 106 have provided opportunities for its deployment. But Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage is not confined to the cataclysmic events in the history of a nation: cases of hardship resulting from an unforeseeable change of circumstances have come before the courts at all times and quite independently of war, inflation and change of political system. Judicial revaluation of the type undertaken by RGZ 107, 78 107 (not, strictly speaking, a case of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage since the Imperial Court based its decision directly upon § 242 BGB) has remained a very exceptional cause célèbre; it is today, as one of the leading commentaries puts it reassuringly, of only historical significance. 108 Closely related to Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage is the right to terminate a long-term contractual relationship 'for an important reason' without the necessity to observe a period of notice. 109 This is specifically laid down with regard to leases of accommodation ( § 554 a BGB), contracts of service ( § 626 BGB)
